Order Without Judges: Customary Adjudication by Blocher, Joseph
BLOCHER IN PRINTER PROOF REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2012 2:40 PM 
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ABSTRACT 
  Scholarship on custom and law has largely focused on the creation 
and enforcement of informal rules, demonstrating and in some cases 
endorsing the existence of “order without law.” But creating and 
enforcing rules are only two of the three functions of governance, 
corresponding roughly with what in other contexts are called the 
legislative and executive branches. The third function—
adjudication—has not played such a prominent role in the scholarly 
literature on informal governance. As one leading scholar puts it: 
“Custom has no constitution or judges.” But if customs can be created 
and enforced by nonstate actors, why should scholars assume that 
formal (that is, noncustomary) courts are the only institutions that do 
or should adjudicate those customs? 
  This Essay seeks to describe and emphasize the role of customary 
adjudication, the third branch of customary governance. In doing so, 
it has three main goals: first, to argue that customary governance can 
be understood in terms of the same three functions familiar to 
students of formal governance; second, to deliver a preliminary and 
tentative account of the third of these branches; and finally, to suggest 
that existing scholarship on custom and law has given comparatively 
little attention to the functions and forms of customary adjudication. 
If successful, those contributions should set the stage for future 
descriptive and normative work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Custom-and-law scholarship has traditionally explored two 
major elements of informal governance: first, how custom arises,1 and 
second, how custom is enforced.2 These elements are analogous to the 
legislative and executive functions of formal government. Like laws, 
custom and social norms3 arise and function as rules governing 
individual action, though they are not promulgated by any official 
body. This is the legislative element of customary governance. Like 
laws, social norms also carry sanctions for violators, including 
ostracism and snubs, though these penalties are not administered by 
state officials. This is the executive element of customary governance. 
These traditional accounts of custom and law have not given 
nearly as much attention to the role of customary adjudication. As 
 
 1. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–22 (2000) (describing a 
“[s]ignaling” model of norms); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation 
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355–65 (1997) (describing an “Esteem Theory of Norm 
Origin”).  
 2. Perhaps the most celebrated work on norm enforcement is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). Professor Ellickson’s 
study of Shasta County found that local ranchers followed community norms because of the 
threat of informal sanctions, such as “negative gossip” and forcible self-help. Id. at 57–59.  
 3. This Essay uses the terms custom and social norms interchangeably, along with the 
concepts of customary and informal governance. Cf. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a 
Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 
1233 (1997) (“We used to say ‘customs’ when we were talking about norms; now the norm, of 
course, is to say ‘norm.’”); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in 
the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 809 (1998) (“‘No concept is invoked more by social 
scientists in explanations of human behavior than norm.’ Nevertheless, a specific definition of 
the concept is elusive.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting JAMES S. COLEMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 242 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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one prominent scholar puts it: “Custom has no constitution or 
judges.”4 Indeed, the existing literature focuses disproportionately on 
the existence and content of norms as well as the sanctions that follow 
from their violation,5 rather than on adjudicatory functions such as 
the selection of applicable norms, resolution of disputed facts, 
application of the selected norms to the facts, and recommendation of 
sanctions—the things that courts do in a formal legal system. To the 
degree that scholars have focused on adjudication, they have 
generally asked whether formal adjudicators—judges, that is—should 
take account of custom when deciding cases.6 
There is something oddly asymmetric, however, about treating 
the informal system as capable of creating and enforcing norms, but 
ignoring its role in resolving disputes over their application. If 
informal governance is robust enough to perform the former two 
functions, there is no prima facie reason why it should not also be able 
to perform the third.7 But even as the custom-and-law literature has 
quite properly encouraged scholars to be less “legal-centric,”8 it has 
itself remained generally court-centric. 
This asymmetry is problematic for many reasons. If the literature 
is to be descriptively accurate, it must capture the adjudicatory 
function, just as any basic account of American government must 
acknowledge the role of the courts. And that accuracy is important 
not only for its own sake, but because it enables better normative 
analysis of the virtues and vices of customary governance—whether, 
 
 4. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1996); see also 
SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 175 
(1979) (“[I]t certainly seems to be the case that adjudicatory processes of settlement are largely 
confined to societies with some form of centralized organization.”).  
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 1645–46 (“The subject of this Article is another form 
of decentralized lawmaking: enacting custom. To illustrate, courts may determine fault and 
liability for accidents by applying the norms of the community in which the accident occurred.”); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the 
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992) (“[I]n [tort] cases that arise out of a consensual 
arrangement, negligence is often the appropriate standard for liability, and, where it is so, 
custom should be regarded as conclusive evidence of due care in the absence of any contractual 
stipulation to the contrary.”).  
 7. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA 
L. REV. 4, 34 (1983) (“Courts and other official institutions are not the only settings in which 
adjudication and related modes of disputing take place.”).  
 8. Barak Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Toward a Positive Theory 
of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2330 n.4 (2004). 
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for example, nonstate rule enforcement (i.e., social sanctions) should 
be entitled to deference, but nonstate rule interpretation (i.e., 
customary adjudication), should not. Moreover, simply recognizing 
customary adjudication should help identify and evaluate the 
mechanisms by which custom is adjudicated—face-to-face,9 by tribal 
chiefs,10 in the court of public opinion,11 and so on. 
This Essay attempts to describe the functions and forms of 
customary adjudication and suggests that they deserve more attention 
in the scholarly literature on custom and law. Part I describes a three-
branch model of customary governance and explains how the existing 
literature on custom and law—primarily but not exclusively that 
appearing in law journals12—has provided rich normative accounts of 
customary legislation and enforcement. 
Part II begins to do the same for the third branch of customary 
governance by enumerating some functions of customary 
adjudication, including the identification of governing norms, 
resolution of disputed facts, application of norms to facts, and 
determination of sanctions. Customary adjudication may also perform 
 
 9. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 7, at 16 (“The most typical response to grievances, at 
least to sizeable ones, is to make a claim to the ‘other party’—the merchant, the other driver or 
his insurer, the ex-spouse who has not paid support, etc. . . . A large portion of disputes are 
resolved by negotiation between the parties.”); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s 
No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the 
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1814 (2008) (“Under comedians’ 
norms system, the initial step is also a form of negotiation. When a comedian believes that 
another has taken his bit, often he will confront the alleged appropriator directly, face to face.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New 
Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759, 783 (1991) (“Social control within clans is accomplished 
mostly by informal means such as gossip and ‘tit-for-tat.’ For deeper disagreements, there are 
traditional mediators and judges, such as elders and bigmen. Unresolved disputes can lead to 
violence, especially disputes between clans in the highlands or ethnic groups in squatter 
camps.”). 
 11. See Kathryn Webb Bradley, Introduction, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2008) 
(providing an overview of how intense public interest in high-profile cases and robust First 
Amendment protection of the press may lead to media coverage that erodes the presumption of 
innocence in the public mind and results in a “case [being] tried in the court of public opinion, 
rather than in the courtroom,” with an accompanying “rush to judge, rather than to do justice”); 
cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) 
(“Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs 
protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of 
society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of 
conduct on those who dissent from them . . . . [That protection] is as indispensable to a good 
condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.”).  
 12. As noted below, legal anthropologists have focused more directly on the issue of 
informal adjudication. See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text. 
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functions that are less characteristically adjudicatory, such as 
clarifying custom, educating people about governing rules, and 
spreading information about violators. The identity of the customary 
adjudicators who perform these functions is important because, as the 
custom-and-law literature has emphasized with regard to creation and 
enforcement, the institutional dimension of customary governance is 
crucial.13 
This is a preliminary and extremely tentative account, meant to 
frame research questions rather than resolve them. The custom-and-
law scholarship has benefited enormously from careful sociological 
study of how groups—ranchers,14 diamond merchants,15 and lobster 
gangs16 are among the most famous examples, though by no means 
the only ones—actually govern themselves through custom. But this 
literature has yet to engage thoroughly with the role of customary 
adjudication and adjudicators.17 This is of course a matter of relative, 
not absolute, neglect,18 and there may be good reason for the 
imbalance—perhaps customs must be bright-line rules to be 
enforceable, and thus their violation will be so clear as to obviate the 
need for adjudication. Or perhaps customary adjudication simply 
does not exist,19 since disputes over custom destroy a system of 
customary governance, which, after all, is based on social agreement. 
Maybe disputes over custom inevitably end up in the formal courts 
because no customary adjudicator has the necessary legitimacy to 
pronounce on disputes, or the power to enforce its own judgments. 
 
 13. See Robert M. Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 910 (1979) 
(“Dispute-resolution work begins with the premise that there are many techniques and 
institutions for performing a single social function.”). 
 14. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 40–64 (examining the customary self-governance of 
ranchers).  
 15. See Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: 
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 395–409 (2006) 
(examining customary self-governance in the context of diamond merchants).  
 16. See JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 71–83 (1988) (examining 
customary self-governance in the context of lobster-gang territories).  
 17. I have done some preliminary investigation into two potentially interesting groups—
Key West’s wreckers and North Carolina’s tobacco auctioneers—but have yet to complete a 
paper on either. 
 18. Scholars have paid extensive attention to the adjudication of custom in formal courts. 
See sources cited supra note 6. My focus here is on adjudication of custom by customary 
institutions. 
 19. Cf. E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE NUER 162 (1940) (“In a strict sense Nuer have no 
law. There are conventional compensations for damage, adultery, loss of limb and so forth, but 
there is no authority with power to adjudicate on such matters or to enforce a verdict.”).  
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But these are all hypotheses, not conclusions. This Essay 
attempts three steps toward testing them: first, it argues that 
customary governance can be understood in terms of the three 
familiar branches of formal governance familiar to students; second, it 
delivers a preliminary and tentative account of the third of those 
branches—customary adjudication;20 and third, it suggests that 
custom-and-law scholarship has given comparatively little attention to 
that branch. In doing so, this Essay attempts to illustrate an important 
question, to show that the literature has not addressed it, and to take 
some tentative steps in the direction of an answer. 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL TWO-BRANCH ACCOUNT OF  
CUSTOMARY GOVERNANCE 
Custom can be understood as a system of social order that 
operates outside of the state;21 a system, as Professor Robert Ellickson 
famously put it, of “order without law.”22 So conceived, custom is 
essentially a form of government unto itself, one that creates, 
enforces, and presumably adjudicates its own rules—the same three 
major functions that formal governments perform. The law/custom 
divide appears within each of these functions. With regard to 
legislation—the creation of rules—customs and social norms are rules 
that originate from decentralized social processes, whereas laws are 
rules that originate from centralized state bodies.23 With regard to the 
executive function, a rule enforced by informal social sanctions such 
as gossip and escalating self-help is a social norm,24 whereas a rule 
 
 20. The classic discussion of the forms of adjudication remains Lon L. Fuller, The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365–72 (1978).  
 21. My description of custom here is intentionally hesitant, as giving authoritative 
definition to custom is a task that has bedeviled scholars far better positioned than I. The 
state/custom distinction tracks, albeit imprecisely, related distinctions between formal and 
informal, planned and spontaneous, and rational-legal and charismatic authority. The 
distinction is not likely to create bright lines because the boundaries of what counts as “the 
state” are not capable of precise definition. See Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State 
Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31, 37 (“Almost all governance combines public and private, 
or governmental and non-governmental, aspects.”).  
 22. Professor Ellickson’s account of social control divided the subject into five categories: 
“self-control,” “promise-enforced contracts,” “informal control,” “organization control,” and 
“legal system.” ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 131 tbl.7.3. By “customary governance,” I mean 
what Ellickson called informal control, or norms. Id. at 127, 131 tbl.7.3.  
 23. See id. at 127 (defining norms as “the rules that emanate . . . from social forces”).  
 24. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 81 (1999) (“Further, norms are distinct from legal 
rules. While the violation of law is punished by state actors, the violation of norms is typically 
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enforced by police action and a prison sentence is a legal rule.25 The 
goal of this Part is to show that scholars of custom and law have 
emphasized these rule-creating and rule-enforcing functions and 
largely neglected the rule-interpreting, or judicial, function of custom. 
A. A Tripartite Framework for Customary Governance 
Before distinguishing rule creation and enforcement from rule 
interpretation within custom and law, it may be useful to say more 
about the three-function approach just described. As a conceptual 
matter, treating customary governance as having three branches can 
be illuminating.26 It imposes a familiar and fundamental analytical 
structure that has proven useful not only for understanding American 
government27—whose three branches are of course divided by the 
Constitution itself28—but of other governments as well.29 Indeed, the 
 
punished by private actors. Sanctions imposed on norm violators may include everything from 
informal gossip and disdain to formal exclusion from the group governed by the norms.” 
(citation omitted)); see also McAdams, supra note 1, at 340 (“Roughly speaking, by norms this 
literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because 
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”).  
  The possibility of sanction might also differentiate norms from behavioral regularities. 
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 8 (“What distinguishes social norms from other behavioral 
regularities is that departure from them provokes sanctions . . . .”); Oliar & Sprigman, supra 
note 9, at 1812 (“To be a norm rather than a mere behavioral regularity, the rule against 
appropriation must be enforced; that is, violations must be punished.” (citation omitted)); Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying 
California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1234 n.11 (2000) (“In this Article I define norms 
as patterns of behavior that are widely adhered to by some group of individuals, at least in part 
because of social pressures to conform to that norm. . . . Norms can be distinguished from other 
forms of human behavior that are widely adhered to for reasons having nothing to do with social 
pressures.”). 
 25. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of 
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (2000) (“[T]he ‘imperative theory of 
law’ . . . asserts that a law is an obligation backed by a state sanction.”). 
 26. By dividing customary law into three “branches,” I do not mean to suggest that there 
are rigid and easily identifiable lines between them, nor that the divisions are best understood in 
formalist terms, only that the creation, enforcement, and adjudication of rules are important and 
conceptually distinct functions of government.  
 27. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the doctrine of 
separation of powers as “[t]he division of governmental authority into three branches of 
government—legislative, executive, and judicial—each with specified duties on which neither of 
the other branches can encroach”); CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR 
AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 45 (2001) 
(“The division of powers among three branches of government is perhaps the most fundamental 
feature of American government.”).  
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I (establishing the executive branch); id. art. II (establishing the 
legislative branch); id. art. III (establishing the judicial branch).  
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three-branch approach has become such a familiar way of looking at 
government that students of the American system might forget we are 
employing it, like glasses a person forgets he is wearing. Refocusing 
on the three “essentially different powers of government”30 makes it 
possible to speak with more precision about the specific kinds of 
governance performed by the formal and informal systems. 
Disaggregating the branches of customary governance is 
important not only for the conceptual clarity it offers but also because 
of the analysis that disaggregation permits. Perhaps most importantly, 
it enables exploration of particular customary functions, rather than 
treating customary governance as an amorphous form of social 
practice. Like a formal legal system, one of the functions of a 
customary system is to create rules. Another function common to 
both systems is the enforcement of those rules. And, as this Essay 
argues, both systems must also settle disputes over what rules mean 
and how they apply to a given situation. This is the adjudicatory 
function, and it is often referred to as,31 but can be distinguished from, 
the enforcement of custom. In the familiar three-function framework, 
courts do not, strictly speaking, enforce law; rather, they determine 
when it has been violated and prescribe sanctions.32 Executive branch 
 
 29. See, e.g., Fraser v. Pub. Serv. Staff Relations Bd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, 469 (Can.) 
(“There is in Canada a separation of powers among the three branches of government—the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary.”); B.N. Srikrishna, The Indian Legal System, 36 
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 242, 242 (2008) (“The Constitution of India has set up three branches of 
the State: 1. the executive, 2. the judiciary, and 3. the legislature.”). 
 30. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (“The Constitution in 
distributing the powers of government, creates three distinct and separate departments—the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. This separation is not merely a matter of convenience 
or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital, namely, to preclude a commingling 
of these essentially different powers of government in the same hands.” (citation omitted)).  
 31. See, e.g., Michael Conant, The Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause and the Law 
Merchant: Swift v. Tyson and the Unity of Commercial Law, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 153, 156 
(1984) (“[D]iamond merchants have systematically rejected use of public courts and state-
created law to enforce contracts and police behavior.”); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial 
Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005) (same); Eric A. Posner, 
The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 158 & n.53 (1996) (same); Richman, supra note 15, at 384 (referring to 
courts’ inability to enforce custom). 
 32. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 454 (1993) (“The Constitution balances the power of the three branches 
of government—legislative, executive and judicial—by granting the legislative branch the power 
to enact the laws, the executive branch the power to enforce the laws, and the courts the power 
to interpret the laws.”). 
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officials—police, federal marshals, and the like—are responsible for 
enforcement. Along the same lines, customary adjudication 
determines when custom has been violated and sometimes prescribes 
informal sanctions. 
This functionalist approach, in turn, permits an institutional 
analysis—one that draws attention not only to what legal and 
customary systems do but on who has power and responsibility for 
doing so.33 Just as the rule-making, rule-enforcing, and rule-
interpreting functions vary, so too do the identities of the people or 
institutions with responsibility for performing them. A norm may be 
created by the community as a whole and enforced by a particular set 
of individuals within it—the peers of the norm violator, for example. 
Either of these groups, or a separate actor entirely, could determine 
when the norm has been violated and what sanctions are appropriate. 
Disaggregating the three branches of customary governance also 
enables a more detailed and accurate view of how custom does or 
should interact with the formal legal system. The simplified version of 
custom as a single undifferentiated mass fails to capture the nuanced 
ways in which the customary and formal legal systems interact. For 
example, custom-and-law scholars often focus on the question of 
whether courts should apply custom when deciding cases.34 But there 
is no prima facie reason why courts are or should be the only point at 
which the formal and customary systems interact, nor why formal 
courts should be the only ones to adjudicate customary disputes. 
 
  If one believes enforcement to be an adjudicatory function, this Essay can simply be 
read as arguing that some adjudicatory functions—those discussed in Part I.A—have been 
undervalued in the literature. 
 33. This distinction between what and who tracks the functionalism-versus-formalism 
debate in American constitutional law. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between 
Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 
(1998) (“Formalism might be associated with bright-line rules that seek to place determinate, 
readily enforceable limits on public actors. Functionalism, at least as an antipode, might be 
associated with standards or balancing tests that seek to provide public actors with greater 
flexibility.”); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers 
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (“The Supreme 
Court has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to separation-of-
powers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of 
government . . . and a functional approach that stresses core function and relationship, and 
permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not threatened.” (citations omitted)). 
 34. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 1694 (“The theory developed in this Article argues 
that the lawmaker’s role is to find community norms, apply the structural test, and enforce the 
norms that pass the test.”); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1–2 (“Here the relevant question is this: 
where the defendant has complied with an industry custom, is that an absolute defense against a 
charge of negligence and, therefore, a finding of liability . . . ?”).  
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Indeed, recognizing the three separate branches of formal and 
customary governance illuminates a range of interesting possibilities 
for interaction between the two systems, an approach more nuanced 
and accurate than a binary choice between law or custom. Sometimes 
courts apply custom when deciding cases—the equivalent of a formal 
adjudicator interpreting informal law. The reverse may also be true, 
for example when the informal “court of public opinion” finds 
someone guilty of having violated a formal law, even when that 
person was found innocent in a state-run court.35 In other cases, 
private parties use informal sanctions to pressure one another into 
following the law—the equivalent of the customary executive 
enforcing formal law.36 Other combinations are not hard to imagine. 
Professor Eric Feldman’s study of the Tsukiji Tuna Court in Japan 
provides a nuanced example of a formal-informal mix-and-match. 
The Tuna Court is a formalized dispute resolution system created by 
the state,37 but it is staffed by industry experts rather than judges,38 
and its substantive rules seem to have originated as social norms.39  
B. Creating Custom 
The bulk of the literature on custom and law focuses on the 
important questions of how and why customs arise. Sometimes 
implicitly, this literature also addresses the question of who has the 
power to create customs—who, in other words, serves the legislative 
function with regard to custom. These descriptive and explanatory 
accounts are deeply intertwined with the normative question of 
 
 35. This point of contact is worth particular attention, if only because it suggests ways in 
which those who create formal law may be unable to control its impact. My thanks to Curt 
Bradley for emphasizing this point. 
 36. Cf. Richman, supra note 15, at 397 (“The [New York Diamond Dealers Club’s 
(DDC’s)] system of arbitration and information exchange thus sets the stage for other family- 
and community-based institutions to enforce the industry’s executory contracts; if the DDC 
announces the verdict, then these complementary institutions are the sheriffs that enforce it.”). 
 37. Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 354 (2006) (“The rules for handling disputes at Tsukiji are thus state law, 
which is interpreted and imposed by a specialized public court.”). 
 38. Id. at 339. 
 39. Some of the Tuna Court’s operative rules are derived from customary sources. See id. 
at 358 (“[T]he Tuna Court’s very existence likely depends on social norms. Although it is 
difficult to verify, for instance, the principle that the risk of latent defects should be borne by 
both buyers and sellers may have started as a market norm and been formalized as a legal rule 
in the [Tokyo Metropolitan Government] ordinance. And norms that bear on trust and 
reputation help to keep buyers and their disputes within the market’s dispute-resolution 
mechanism.”). 
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whether and to what degree custom should be entitled to deference 
or support within the formal legal system. 
The incubator of social norms—the customary legislature—is 
generally thought to be the close-knit group.40 Professor Ellickson, for 
example, argues that “members of a close-knit group develop and 
maintain norms . . . [that] maximize the aggregate welfare” and that 
“members of tight social groups will informally encourage each other 
to engage in cooperative behavior.”41 Other scholars have focused on 
somewhat broader patterns of social interaction, while still invoking 
the close-knit group as an important creator of norms.42 Professor 
Richard McAdams explains the creation of norms in terms of a 
natural human preference for esteem;43 Professor Eric Posner builds 
his theory on the value of signaling and cooperation.44 
These descriptive accounts of how and why particular customs 
arise are closely connected with the normative question of whether 
they should be entitled to special respect from the legal system itself. 
Most legal scholars addressing the role of custom in the private-law 
setting seem to answer the question affirmatively, with varying 
 
 40. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 177–78 (“The hypothesis predicts that welfare-
maximizing norms emerge in close-knit settings . . . . This qualification is necessary because an 
informal-control system may not be effective if the social conditions within a group do not 
provide members with information about norms and violations and also the power and 
enforcement opportunities needed to establish norms.”). 
 41. Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“In uncovering the various Shasta County 
norms, I was struck that they seemed consistently utilitarian. Each appeared likely to enhance 
the aggregate welfare of rural residents. This inductive observation, coupled with supportive 
data from elsewhere, inspired the hypothesis that members of a close-knit group develop and 
maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in 
their workaday affairs with one another.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence 
of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 507–09, 561–67 (2003) 
(arguing, inter alia, that in the file-sharing community, a norm of reciprocity explains why users 
make their files available to others, and that this reciprocity norm was inculcated in other social 
settings and carried over into the Internet).  
 43. McAdams, supra note 1, at 355–58 (“Under the right conditions, the desire for esteem 
produces a norm. For some behavior X in some population of individuals, a norm may arise if 
(1) there is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in X . . . ; 
(2) there is some risk that others will detect whether one engages in X; and (3) the existence of 
this consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the relevant population.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 44. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 18–27 (“The signaling theory suggests that any costly 
action can be a signal, that is, a mechanism for establishing or preserving one’s reputation.”); id. 
at 25 (“Rejecting or shunning another person is costly because one cuts off opportunities for 
cooperative gains and risks retaliation. If others mimic the leader in order to avoid being labeled 
bad types, a moral norm would emerge from the statistical norm.”). 
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degrees of certainty and with a wide range of qualifications. Although 
some norms might well maximize group welfare, they could do so at 
cost to “social goals such as equality, corrective justice, or the 
protection of fundamental individual liberties.”45 Indeed, norms can 
be socially destructive,46 random,47 inefficient,48 or impose costs on 
outsiders.49 Professor Lisa Bernstein, for example, has argued that 
courts should be cautious when using custom to supplement written 
agreements.50 Bernstein points out that lawsuits often signal the end 
of a relationship, and the parties involved might not want the rules 
they use in their day-to-day affairs to govern such disputes.51 
Separating desirable from undesirable norms is therefore one of 
the major questions for custom-and-law scholarship. Professor Robert 
Cooter suggests that formal courts do so by engaging in “structural 
adjudication,”52 a practice of enforcing only those norms that arise as 
 
 45. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 169–70. 
 46. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1064–71 (1995) (presenting and 
defending economic theories of discriminatory caste systems and concluding that 
“[d]iscrimination exists because it is productive for its practitioners”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2035 (1996) (“[C]hoices are a function of 
norms for which individual agents are not responsible and which, on reflection, many or most 
agents may not endorse.”).  
 47. Professor Posner’s theory, in fact, depends on some random variation in order to form 
majorities. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 26 (demonstrating how hairstyle norms develop from 
initial random distributions). 
 48. See McAdams, supra note 1, at 412 (“All kinds of judgments can produce a norm. 
When the norm does not arise to solve a collective action problem, the norms are necessarily 
inefficient because the costs incurred in obeying and enforcing such norms produce no social 
benefit.”); see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 172–77 (“In sum, one can make no presumptions 
about whether group norms are efficient and about whether a legal intervention will improve 
behavior in close-knit groups.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 234 n.5 (“Dueling was widely seen as 
ridiculous shortly before its demise, and was satirized. Clothing fashions seem ridiculous as soon 
as they pass. Dysfunctional norms often make people feel ridiculous but helpless: for example, 
wearing ties or high heels, or attending a party for someone everyone hates, or a celebration of 
someone who has done nothing good, or receiving gifts that one does not want from people who 
do not want to give them.” (citations omitted)).  
 49. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 169 (“[N]orms that add to the welfare of the members 
of a certain group commonly impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that group. Examples 
are the norms of racial segregation in the Jim Crow era in the South, and norms of loyalty 
among the Gypsies or the Mafia.”). 
 50. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1996) (“This Article challenges 
the idea that courts should seek to discover and apply immanent business norms in deciding 
cases.”). 
 51. Id. at 1770.  
 52. Cooter, supra note 4, at 1677. 
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a result of long-run relationships, have minimal externalities, and 
when there is not another approach that is clearly superior.53 Norms 
that meet this test will be welfare-maximizing, he argues, and judges 
should therefore rely on them when deciding cases.54 This may well be 
so, but the fact that formal courts play the lead role in Professor 
Cooter’s account of structural adjudication further emphasizes the 
degree to which the forms and functions of customary adjudication 
have been minimized. 
C. Enforcing Custom 
No matter which account of norm creation one finds persuasive, 
a second and equally crucial inquiry arises: How are norms to be 
enforced? This is a difficult question because the state’s monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force effectively deprives custom enforcers of 
one of the most useful tools for forcing compliance. And yet scholars 
have demonstrated that, in many cases, it is possible to create order 
without law by using customary enforcement mechanisms—social and 
reputational sanctions, for example—and customary enforcers such as 
peers and business partners. 
One approach, of course, would be to say that customary rules 
are or should be enforced through state-backed sanctions. This is the 
approach implicitly taken by those who argue that customary 
practices should be treated as law and enforced by the state against 
noncomplying parties.55 But the appeal to state power, as useful and 
effective as it may be, is not truly a form of customary governance, or 
at least not of customary enforcement. Relying on the police or other 
formal law enforcers to ensure compliance with customary rules 
means combining the customary rule-making function with the formal 
rule-executing function. 
State-backed sanctions, however, are not the only option when it 
comes to enforcement of customary rules and obligations. One of the 
central insights of the custom-and-law literature is that social 
 
 53. See id. at 1677–78 (describing three conditions—“long-run relations,” “no spill-overs,” 
and “convexity”—under which “enforcement of social norms is fair by the norms of the 
community to which they apply and efficient by the standards of economics”).  
 54. See id. at 1696 (“[A] common law court should find that a social norm is law if it 
evolved from an appropriate incentive structure. An appropriate incentive structure is one in 
which incentives for signaling by individuals align with the public good (long-run relations, 
convexity, no spill-overs).”). 
 55. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6. 
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sanctions such as gossip and exclusion56 can be, and often are, just as 
effective in ensuring compliance with customary rules.57 For example, 
a comedian who violates norms by retelling another comedian’s joke 
may be subjected to loss of reputation and other social sanctions, such 
as mockery or peers’ refusal to share billing.58 Such reputational 
sanctions can be devastating for comedians, just as they can be for 
merchants who rely on their own reputations.59 Other sanctions are 
more direct. Ranchers who suffer repeated or egregious trespasses 
from another’s cattle sometimes respond by injuring the offending 
animals, thereby inflicting another type of extralegal, and perhaps 
illegal, sanction.60 Some aggrieved ranchers even resort to 
interpersonal violence.61 And lest it be thought that ranchers are 
 
 56. See Rai, supra note 24, at 81 (“Sanctions imposed on norm violators may include 
everything from informal gossip and disdain to formal exclusion from the group governed by the 
norms.”).  
 57. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 282–83 (“[O]ne reason people are frequently 
willing to ignore law is that they often possess more expeditious means for achieving order. For 
example, neighbors in rural Shasta County are sufficiently close-knit to generate and enforce 
informal norms to govern minor irritations such as cattle-trespass and boundary-fence 
disputes.”); POSNER, supra note 1, at 19–20 (analyzing how reputation can affect a person’s 
economic potential); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 23 (1987) (noting 
that groups “can wield with great effectiveness a range of positive and negative sanctions, 
including the sanctions of approval and disapproval”); Robert D. Cooter, Structural 
Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 215, 223 (“Empirical studies of community life and business practice have often 
concluded that informal sanctions are more important than the law in enforcing norms.”); 
McAdams, supra note 1, at 355–56 (focusing on the intrinsic value of esteem).  
 58. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1815. For a demonstration, see Peteholloway, 
Stewart Lee — Joe Pasquale Joke, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=0YE9Kthyaco (excerpt from a Stewart Lee set, broadcast on Comedy Central’s 
Edinburgh & Beyond in 2006). 
 59. See, e.g., Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of 
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne 
Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 9–10 (1990) (noting that if traders are adequately informed of a 
trader’s previous transgression, they will institute informal sanctions); Richman, supra note 15, 
at 396–97 (“Merchants comply with the DDC arbitration board only to preserve good 
reputations and protect the opportunity to engage in future diamond transactions.”). 
 60. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 58 (“Despite the criminality of the conduct . . . , I 
learned the identity of two persons who had shot trespassing cattle. Another landowner told of 
running the steer of an uncooperative neighbor into a fence.”).  
 61. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 679 (1986) (“[F]ear of physical retaliation is undoubtedly 
one of the major incentives for order in rural Shasta County.”); see also Donald Black, Crime as 
Social Control, in 2 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 1, 7 (Donald Black 
ed., 1984) (“Most conduct that a lawyer would label as assault may also be understood as self-
help. In the vast majority of cases the people involved know one another, usually quite 
intimately, and the physical attack arises in the context of a grievance or quarrel.”).  
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uniquely prone to violent retribution, it is worth noting that 
comedians have been known to punch those who steal punch lines.62 
Considering the conditions under which custom should be 
expected to succeed helps illustrate the other important feature of 
customary enforcement: the actors and institutions responsible for 
imposing sanctions. These actors play the same role in customary 
governance as police and other law-enforcement officials in the 
formal system. In the examples above, customary enforcers are often 
peers—other comedians, for example.63 Rural ranchers fear gossip 
from neighbors.64 Tuna traders who are too litigious can be sanctioned 
through loss of business.65 
This brief account of customary enforcement is meant to 
illustrate the functions of the customary executive branch by 
describing both its outputs and its institutions. That is, customary 
governance has its own versions of the formal executive branch’s 
sanctions—prison terms, fines, and the like—and sanctioners—law-
enforcement officers from the president on down to the police. 
II.  THE UNDER-RECOGNIZED THIRD BRANCH: A PRELIMINARY 
ACCOUNT OF CUSTOMARY ADJUDICATION 
As the preceding Part demonstrates, the existing literature has 
painted a rich picture of the relationship between custom and law. 
But that picture places the legislative and executive functions 
prominently in the foreground, with adjudication appearing only in 
the background, if at all. This Part attempts to touch up the picture by 
focusing directly, if briefly, on the functions of customary 
adjudication. 
A great deal of custom-and-law scholarship describes the norms 
or customs of a particular (and generally very interesting) 
 
 62. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1820 (“[A]cts of violent or potentially violent 
retribution enjoy considerable legitimacy within the comedic community. In some instances the 
attackers appear to feel morally justified. Comedian George Lopez did not try to hide the fact 
that he punched Carlos Mencia in a dispute over suspected joke stealing—rather he boasted 
about it publicly on The Howard Stern Show.”).  
 63. See id. at 1817 (“A second retaliation option, often employed as an adjunct to shunning 
and bad-mouthing, is for an aggrieved comedian (and sometimes that comedian’s friends and 
allies) to refuse to appear on the same bill with a known joke thief.”).  
 64. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 57.  
 65. See Feldman, supra note 37, at 344 (“As one seller put it, ‘Why would I, as the 
auctioneer, sell a fish to someone who I know might loudly complain if I could sell it to someone 
else? It’s only natural.’”). 
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community—ranchers,66 whalers,67 comedians,68 roller-derby girls,69 
jam bands,70 French chefs,71 and so on72—and how each community’s 
norms are, can be, or should be enforced in the event of a breach. But 
these analyses assume that there is agreement about what norm 
applies, what the facts are, and whether a breach has occurred, 
assumptions rarely, if ever, made with regard to the formal legal 
system. Indeed, determining whether a rule has been violated is 
arguably the principal function of courts. The questions of who gets to 
decide whether a rule has been breached and how that determination 
is to be made are therefore crucial to understanding any system of 
governance, whether formal or informal. 
It is far beyond the scope of this Essay to define the essential 
attributes of adjudication. Professor Lon Fuller, in his classic The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication,73 focuses on the role of judges in 
an “institutional framework that is intended to assure to the 
disputants an opportunity for the presentation of proofs and reasoned 
arguments,”74 and argues that “[a]djudication is a process of decision 
that grants to the affected party a form of participation that consists 
in the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments.”75 
Others have defined adjudication as “the process by which final, 
 
 66. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 1–120. 
 67. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from 
the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 89–90 (1989) (describing the customs and rules 
that are used to resolve disputes over ownership of harvested whales). 
 68. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1809–31. 
 69. David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Emergent Intellectual Property Norms Governing 
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1108–31 (2012). 
 70. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us 
About Persuading People To Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 691–718 
(2006). 
 71. Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: 
The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 192–94 (2008).  
 72. See Richman, supra note 8, at 2334 (noting that the private-ordering literature 
“contains genuinely interesting stories”). This Essay unfortunately lacks such a story. I hope to 
provide one in future work.  
 73. Fuller, supra note 20. 
 74. Id. at 365. 
 75. Id. at 369; see also Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 
113 YALE L.J. 27, 29 (2003) (“The traditional judicial role was characterized by two guiding 
principles: Judges relied on the parties to frame disputes and on legal standards to help resolve 
them.”); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 988 (1987) (“As Lon Fuller and 
others have taught us, it is resolving disputes through reasoned and principled deliberation, 
based on rules, that is at the heart of adjudication.”). 
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authoritative decisions are rendered by a neutral third party who 
enters the controversy without previous knowledge of the dispute.”76 
Customary adjudication is to formal adjudication what custom is 
to law and what social sanctions are to formal sanctions. That is to 
say, it is the nonstate equivalent of the third branch of government. 
And like courts, customary adjudication can be understood in terms 
of its functions as well as its form. Those functions vary widely, but 
some are relatively common. The following representative functions 
do not constitute a comprehensive list, nor are they strictly necessary 
to all forms of adjudication.77 
First is factfinding. In formal systems, one essential role of courts 
is the determination of disputed facts—whether a criminal defendant 
possessed drugs, whether a defective product caused injury, and so 
on.78 Customary adjudication must have a similar function to establish 
a link between action, norm, and sanction. Professor Jeffrey 
Rachlinski explains that fact clarification is often performed with the 
help, intentional or not, of others.79 Because customary adjudicators 
are generally members of the community in which the dispute arises, 
they are often particularly well suited to this factfinding role. Judges 
on the Tuna Court, for example, “are not members of the national 
judiciary, nor do they have any legal training.”80 Rather, “they are 
registered tuna auctioneers who work for the Tsukiji tuna brokers 
(oroshi) in the specialized tuna and swordfish division.”81 Similarly, 
tribunals in the cotton industry are composed of arbitrators selected 
 
 76. ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 21 (4th ed. 2006); see also William L.F. 
Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 63, 69 (1974) 
(“Conventionally we label as adjudication that process in which the third party is acknowledged 
to have the power to stipulate an outcome of the dispute . . . .”). 
 77. Cf. Cover, supra note 13, at 911 (“A court not only resolves disputes, but also allocates 
resources, confers legitimacy, administers other institutions, promulgates norms, allocates costs, 
and records statistics, to mention but a few of its more commonly recognized functions.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 78. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law 
Is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2465 (2010) (“[I]t seems to be socially necessary to make 
certain claims of fact binding as a matter of law . . . . This establishing is what it means for a 
court to ‘find’ facts, and it is among courts’ most characteristic and essential functions.”).  
 79. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1554 
(2000) (discussing how group settings affect individuals’ interpretations of factual situations).  
 80. Feldman, supra note 37, at 339. 
 81. Id.; see also id. at 339 n.69 (“Although the ordinance allows buyers to serve as judges, it 
seems that the time commitment makes this unattractive, and no buyers are currently involved 
in adjudicating cases.”). 
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by industry associations.82 This relevant expertise presumably 
improves their ability to understand and find relevant facts. 
Second is identifying the relevant custom. Customary 
adjudicators must be able to identify the content of norms and 
determine which of many possible norms governs a given situation. 
As Professor Rachlinski points out, “social norms are always in 
tension with each other, which makes predictions as to which norm 
will dictate social behavior invariably unstable.”83 For example, it may 
be customary for the head of a household to sit at the head of a table 
but also customary for an honored guest to do so. At any dinner with 
such a guest in attendance, a determination must be made as to which 
norm will govern. Customary adjudication must therefore include a 
determination of the proper governing norm.84 
Third is applying the norm to the facts—that is, making 
conclusions of custom. Though norms are often extremely clear-cut, 
leading to a relatively simple application, it is not hard to imagine 
situations in which a resolution could go either way. Say, for example, 
that a comedian tells a joke that another comedian already told in 
public. He does so inadvertently, however, not realizing that he was 
effectively retelling another person’s joke. Is that a violation of the 
industry norms against joke stealing? (The answer, it seems, may be 
yes; joke retelling is apparently a strict-liability offense.85) 
Fourth is determining an appropriate sanction.86 Just as formal 
courts hand down judgments saying more than just “Party A is right,” 
sometimes customary adjudicators not only declare who prevails, but 
also what remedy is appropriate. It is at this stage that formal and 
customary adjudication begin to diverge most sharply, in part because 
the menu of sanctions available in customary governance is, as 
explained in Part I.C, different than in a formal system. Additionally, 
 
 82. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1728 (2001).  
 83. Rachlinski, supra note 79, at 1541. 
 84. This determination is particularly complicated in cases in which custom conflicts with 
formal law. 
 85. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1816 (“Here is how the well-known comedian Robin 
Williams, who has faced long-standing allegations of joke stealing, describes the experience: 
‘Yeah, I hung out in clubs eight hours a night, improvising with people, playing with them, doing 
routines. And I heard some lines once in a while and I used some lines on talk shows 
accidentally. That’s what got me that reputation and that’s why I’m f***ing fed up with it.’” 
(quoting Playboy Interview: Robin Williams, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1 1992, at 57, 62)). 
 86. This is not necessarily the same as imposing a sanction. See supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. 
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customary adjudication may place a higher premium on reconciling 
the parties87 and performing mediation88 than on identifying breaches 
or determining damages. 
More importantly, adjudication and enforcement are closely 
related—perhaps inseparable—in the context of custom. The judicial 
and executive functions blend in customary governance because 
public adjudication spreads information, and the spreading of 
information can amount to enforcement through reputational 
sanctions.89 The announcement of an adverse judgment is itself a 
sanction, precisely because of its impact on reputation. This was the 
case, for example, with the medieval law merchant. Enforcement of 
official judgments was extremely difficult,90 but the law merchant 
could keep account of those merchants who defaulted. The 
dissemination of this information created strong compliance 
incentives because merchants needed to protect their reputations as 
business partners. In their landmark study of the law merchant, 
Professors Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast 
conclude that “the role of the judges in the system, far from being 
substitutes for the reputation mechanism, is to make the reputation 
system more effective as a means of promoting honest trade.”91 
 
 87. See, e.g., LUCY MAIR, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 149 (2d ed. 
1972) (“[T]he decisions of the courts [of some African societies] were concerned as much with 
reconciling the parties as with awarding damages or punishing offenses.”). 
 88. See, e.g., P.H. GULLIVER, SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY 299 (1963) 
(“The solution of a dispute between Arusha does not come from authoritative decision, but 
through agreement resulting from discussion and negotiation between the parties which are in 
conflict.”); ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 26 (“In stateless societies, . . . third parties are typically 
limited to acting as go-betweens, transmitting messages from one disputant to another, or as 
mediators, actively coaxing the parties towards a settlement, but still without the power to 
resolve the matter by decision.”); Audrey Butt, The Shaman’s Legal Role, 16 REVISTA DO 
MUSEU PAULISTA 151, 158 (1965) (describing the function of séances conducted by shamans in 
the Guiana Highlands as “provid[ing] an occasion for bringing disputes and malpractices into 
the open: if a culprit does not openly argue his case or make his excuses, the séance at least 
informs him that his various activities are under public scrutiny and he is given the chance of 
setting wrongs to rights”).  
 89. Cf. Milgrom et al., supra note 59, at 10 (“The institution that we model as the 
resolution of these problems is based on the presence of a specialized actor—a ‘judge’ or ‘law 
merchant’ (LM) who serves both as a repository of information and as an adjudicator of 
disputes.”). Of course, a judgment of guilt in a formal adjudicatory proceeding will often lead to 
reputational sanctions as well.  
 90. See id. at 2 (“While hearings were held to resolve disputes under the code, the judges 
had only limited powers to enforce judgments against merchants from distant places.”).  
 91. Id. at 3. This conclusion has been analyzed and criticized from many angles. See, e.g., 
Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1156–58 
(2012) (arguing that medieval law merchants did not create universal customs but instead relied 
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Professors Ellickson and McAdams similarly conclude that gossip 
networks can enforce norms when knowledge of a violation moves 
freely.92 
Fifth is educating the members of the community. The educative 
function of adjudication is important not only because it spreads 
knowledge about who has violated rules but also, as Professor 
Bernstein points out, because it educates “members of the trade 
about the content of the rules and the contours of proper business 
practices.”93 Customary authorities can therefore help clarify, 
reaffirm, or elucidate customary rules, in much the same way that 
courts “explicate and give force to the values embodied in 
authoritative texts such as the Constitution.”94 Indeed, the social 
sanctioning of a norm violator reaffirms not only the content of the 
norm but also the obligation of the community to uphold and enforce 
it. As Professor McAdams explains, “[t]he primary consensus that 
behavior X merits disapproval is therefore likely to lead to a 
secondary consensus that those who expressly approve, or fail to 
disapprove, of the perpetrators of X merit disapproval.”95 
 
on local laws in resolving disputes); Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern 
Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 699 (2006) 
(“[C]oercive power—to enforce decisions, to collect damages, and to assess fines—was 
exercised routinely [in thirteenth-century St. Ives].”). 
 92. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 180–81; see also Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, 
Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2251 (1996) (proposing a two-stage model for 
development of norms, in which “[i]n the first stage, some group members internalize the norm 
and are willing to bear costs to enforce it,” and “[i]n the second stage, their public norm 
enforcement causes other members to internalize the norm”). 
 93. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: 
A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 773–74 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Questionable 
Empirical Basis]. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, 
Opting Out] (“An important feature of the arbitration system [for diamond merchants] is the 
secrecy of the proceedings.”); id. at 127 (“The absence of explicit findings of fact and written 
opinions is a precaution to prevent people from complaining, rightly or wrongly, that the 
arbitrators were biased, unfair, or relied on evidence that lacked probative value.”); McAdams, 
supra note 92, at 2251 (“Even for adults, public enforcement may be crucial for inculcating new 
members with group values.”). 
 94. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); cf. Neil S. Siegel, 
The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963 (2008) (suggesting that judicial 
statesmanship “charges judges with approaching cases so as to facilitate the capacity of the legal 
system to legitimate itself by accomplishing two paradoxically related preconditions and 
purposes of law: expressing social values as social circumstances change and sustaining social 
solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement”). 
 95. McAdams, supra note 1, at 372. 
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Together, these pressures can contribute to the internalization of 
norms, which is crucial to the success of the system as a whole.96 They 
are also a very important mechanism for the development and 
revision of custom, for as Professor Cooter points out, “[u]nlike law, 
custom lacks secondary rules. Custom does not prescribe procedures 
for making, revising, or repealing itself.”97 As a result, customary 
adjudication might well play an even more important role in the 
development of custom than court decisions do in the development of 
the common law. 
Because these functions seem straightforward and intuitive, it 
might be surprising that custom-and-law scholarship has not 
addressed them in much detail. Some may protest that the literature 
does do so. Of course, proving a negative is always a difficult 
proposition, and it is not my goal here to demonstrate that no scholar 
has previously addressed the issue. But as the following discussion 
attempts to show, the traditional treatment of dispute resolution in 
custom largely fails to address the adjudicatory functions laid out 
above. Some scholars have effectively ignored the existence of 
disputes about which, if any, norm governs a given conflict. Others 
have focused predominately or exclusively on adjudication in formal 
courts. Yet others have given attention to semiformal organizational 
courts such as arbitration panels. None of these approaches offers a 
full account of customary adjudication. 
First, much custom-and-law scholarship downplays the point at 
which disputes arise, jumping straight from the creation of a norm to 
its enforcement. Professor Ellickson’s canonical Order Without Law,98 
for example, purports to address “how residents of rural Shasta 
County, California, resolve a variety of disputes.”99 But the actual 
resolution of these disputes in an adjudicatory sense—the 
determination of what social norm governs and how it applies, for 
example—is mostly sidelined. As Professor Lewis Kornhauser 
pointed out in his review of the book: 
 
 96. See Cooter, supra note 4, at 1665 (“[A] social norm is ineffective in a community and 
does not exist unless people internalize it.”).  
 97. Id. at 1654. From this, Professor Cooter concludes that “[c]ustom has no constitution or 
judges. A person who wants to change custom must use whatever means are at hand to convince 
others to follow different norms.” Id. I obviously disagree with the first of these statements, at 
least to the degree that it would minimize the importance of the adjudicatory function described 
here. 
 98. ELLICKSON, supra note 2. 
 99. Id. at 1. 
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  Ellickson uses the term “dispute.” However, I have placed 
“dispute” in quotes because these transactions display little 
disagreement either over the facts or over the relevant norms 
governing these facts. When X delivers a gross of widgets to Y with 
payment expected in 30 days, we do not think that Y’s prompt 
payment constitutes a dispute. Nor do we necessarily view X and Y 
as disputing if, after Y returns the delivery as non-conforming to the 
contract specifications, X delivers a conforming gross.100 
Other scholarship in the Ellicksonian tradition similarly addresses 
situations in which customary rules are clear,101 and disputes over the 
existence of a violation correspondingly rare. Whalers adhered to a 
rigid fast-fish rule that clearly indicated possession of an animal.102 
Comedians give precedence to the first to perform a joke.103 In roller 
derby, a Master Roster of pseudonyms decides which skater gets to 
use a contested name based on who registered it first.104 And for jam 
bands, the question is simply whether or not the band has green-
lighted the duplication of a particular work.105 In each of these cases, 
and most of the other scholarly examples, the potential for a real 
dispute is limited, because the rules are exceedingly clear. 
Second, to the degree that scholars have addressed the 
adjudication of customary disputes, they have tended to assume that 
such adjudication does or should take place in formal, state-
sanctioned courts. Indeed, perhaps the central concern of most 
custom-and-law scholarship has been to identify situations in which 
such courts should resolve disputes using customary rules. Even those 
case studies that seem to explore informal courts actually tend to 
address state-backed courts. Professor Feldman’s study of the Tsukiji 
 
 100. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order?, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 649 n.9 (1992) (reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note 2). 
 101. As discussed, there may be good reasons why custom is generally clear. See supra text 
accompanying notes 18–19.  
 102. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 197–98 (“Prior to 1800, the British whalers operating 
in the Greenland fishery established the norm that a claimant owned a whale, dead or alive, so 
long as the whale was fast—that is, physically connected by line or other device to the claimant’s 
boat or ship.”); see also Ellickson, supra note 67, at 89–90 (same).  
 103. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1826 (explaining that the first comedian to 
perform a joke becomes the exclusive owner of that joke). 
 104. See Fagundes, supra note 69, at 1121 (“If a proposed name is identical to an existing 
registered one, another skater cannot use that proposed name.”). 
 105. See Schultz, supra note 70, at 681 (explaining that many bands do not allow their songs 
to be copied without permission).  
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Tuna Court fits this model.106 Professor Cooter’s study of the land 
courts of Papua New Guinea does, too. As Cooter notes, “[t]he very 
existence of [Papua New Guinea’s] land courts represents a departure 
from customary dispute resolution,” which was traditionally done by 
appealing to village elders and bigmen.107 Even as custom-and-law 
scholarship has become less “legal-centric,”108 it has remained largely 
court-centric. 
Another variation in the literature addresses what might be 
called “organizational” adjudication. Professor Bernstein’s work is 
exemplary in this regard. Her studies have shed light on extralegal 
dispute resolution within groups such as diamond dealers,109 grain 
traders,110 and cotton merchants.111 In Professor Bernstein’s work, 
disputes are real, meaty, and complex.112 Professor Barak Richman, 
too, has described the Jewish diamond dealers’ arbitration system113 
and studied how “Jewish community institutions serve as unusually 
effective enforcement mechanisms and thus create a comparative 
advantage for Jewish merchants.”114 These institutions include 
intricate arbitration systems.115 Inasmuch as these tribunals exist apart 
from the state itself,116 Professor Bernstein is “challeng[ing] the idea 
 
 106. See Feldman, supra note 37, at 354 (noting that many of the rules governing the Tsukiji 
Tuna Court are state laws).  
 107. Cooter, supra note 10, at 783.  
 108. Cf. Richman, supra note 8, at 2330 n.4 (discussing criticisms of legal centrism). 
 109. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 93 (“[S]ophisticated traders who dominate the 
[diamond] industry have developed an elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with distinctive 
institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes among industry members. This article explores the 
reasons that this system of private governance has developed and endured within the diamond 
trade.”).  
 110. See Bernstein, supra note 50 (“[This Article] presents a case study of the private legal 
system created by the National Grain and Feed Association (‘NGFA’) to resolve contract 
disputes among its members.”).  
 111. See Bernstein, supra note 82 (describing cotton-merchant associations’ dispute-
resolution systems).  
 112. One example of this complexity is determining the quality of cotton. See, e.g., id. at 
1773–74 (“Even in the absence of opportunism, two cotton transactors, each acting in good 
faith, might well disagree about how to grade a particular shipment, and each might therefore 
conclude that the other has defected.”). 
 113. Richman, supra note 15, at 395–98.  
 114. Id. at 389. 
 115. See Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1771–74 (describing the grain traders’ arbitration 
system); Bernstein, supra note 82, at 1727–31 (describing the cotton merchants’ arbitration 
system); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 93, at 124–25 (describing the diamond dealers’ 
arbitration system). 
 116. As Professor Richman notes, the Memphis Cotton Exchange and the New York DDC 
“generally invite state courts to enforce their rulings,” but “very few private disputes spill into 
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that courts should seek to discover and apply immanent business 
norms in deciding cases”117—thus avoiding the court-centric focus that 
characterizes much of the custom-and-law literature. Professor 
Richman, meanwhile, is primarily interested in the enforcement of 
contracts,118 not the adjudicatory functions discussed in this Essay. 
And yet the kinds of organizational adjudication Professors 
Bernstein and Richman have explored do not capture the full range 
of customary adjudication. Most are centralized dispute-resolution 
tribunals, and the procedural rules they follow are not traditional 
social norms but formal codes crafted by the organization.119 They 
represent what Professor Richman calls “organized” rather than 
“spontaneous” private ordering.120 And as he points out, “[n]ot all 
systems of private law have private judges or arbitrators.”121 Thus 
although industry arbitration boards are “informal” in the sense of 
being nonstate, they are as different from customary adjudication as 
organizational rules are from custom.122 
Other scholars mention customary dispute resolution but do not 
address it in much depth. Medieval Iceland, for example, has been the 
focus of a relatively rich literature on informal governance, 
 
state courts and are instead enforced exclusively through the threat of private, extralegal 
sanctions.” Richman, supra note 8, at 2339 n.32. 
 117. Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1768 (emphasis added).  
 118. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 15, at 389, 392 (discussing the challenges of enforcing 
diamond-executor contracts). 
 119. See Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1777–78 (“The NGFA tribunal does not permit 
unwritten customs and usages of trade to vary or qualify the meaning of either trade rules or 
explicit contractual provisions. Arbitrators use custom to decide cases only when both the trade 
rules and the contract are silent. Yet even when looking to custom to fill a true contractual gap, 
the arbitrators often signal their distaste for this type of adjudication . . . .”); Bernstein, supra 
note 82, at 1731–32 (“The [Board of Appeals] decides contract disputes by applying the 
[Southern Mill Rules], a comprehensive set of bright-line contract default rules that cover 
contract formation, performance, quality, delay, payment, repudiation, excuse, and damages, 
and include numerous industry-specific definitions of terms . . . .”). The diamond dealers may 
use some custom to decide disputes, but they also rely on trade rules set out in bylaws. 
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 93, at 126. 
 120. Richman, supra note 8, at 2339 n.33. 
 121. Id.; see also McAdams, supra note 1, at 351 (“[S]ome theorists prefer to use the term 
norms to refer only to decentralized rules and regard organizational rules as a set of obligations 
falling between centralized law and decentralized norms.”). 
 122. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 127 (distinguishing between norms and organizational 
rules); David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual Relationships, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1842 (1996) (distinguishing between centralized and decentralized 
norms). 
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including—albeit usually in passing—adjudication.123 Icelandic society 
was governed through a combination of local assemblies, called 
“Things,” and annual national assemblies, called “Allthings.” Both 
Things and Allthings functioned as courts, with the latter effectively 
having diversity jurisdiction over cases from different localities and 
appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by Things. Judges in 
these tribunals were selected by chieftains, and “functioned more like 
our juries.”124 
Closer to home, Professor Andrea McDowell provides a 
compelling account of customary adjudication involving gold miners 
in the early days of the California gold rush. The miners used a 
number of more-or-less informal dispute-resolution systems.125 This is 
excellent evidence of customary adjudication in action. But Professor 
McDowell is primarily interested in how the camps maintained order 
on the basis of rules that differed greatly from camp to camp,126 not 
how disputes over those rules were resolved. She applies game theory 
to show that rules do not need normative value to be effective, but 
need only sort the rights of disputants before things get nasty.127 So 
although she provides examples of dispute resolution without courts, 
customary adjudication is not her focus. 
Finally, it is worth noting that scholars operating within the 
framework of legal anthropology—some of them on law faculties, 
many of them not—have devoted some attention to the forms and 
functions of informal adjudication. Professor William Felstiner, for 
 
 123. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and 
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 284–90 (2011) (describing medieval Iceland’s court 
system (citing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990); and JESSE L. BYOCK, MEDIEVAL ICELAND: SOCIETY, 
SAGAS, AND POWER (1988))).  
 124. Id. at 285. 
 125. See Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold 
Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 779 (2004) (“Many mining codes established a procedure 
for settling disputes over claims either by arbitration, by an elected official, or by a jury. In some 
camps, conflicts were settled by a miners’ meeting—that is, by an assembly of all the miners in 
the camp—or at least as many as were willing to come.” (citation omitted)) . 
 126. See id. at 774 (“I argue that the rules were virtually self-enforcing even though they 
varied in detail from camp to camp and sometimes from one day to the next.”). 
 127. See id. at 801 (“In short, the theory of spontaneous order fits the evidence from the 
mines very well.”). To be sure, Professor McDowell argues that the miners were governed by 
law rather than norms. See id. at 807 (“It is part of my argument that mining codes, or rules and 
regulations, represented law rather than norms or custom.”); id. at 772 (“I argue that the mining 
codes were rules, not norms, . . . and that informal controls played little or no role in 
maintaining order.”). 
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example, forty years ago noted that “[i]nstitutionalized responses to 
interpersonal conflict . . . stretch from song duels and witchcraft to 
moots and mediation to self-conscious therapy and hierarchical, 
professionalized courts.”128 Professor Richard Abel, writing around 
the same time as Professor Felstiner, offered a “macrosocial theory to 
explain, in terms of social structural variables,” the types of “dispute 
institutions” in society.129 Others, operating in a more directly 
anthropological vein, have studied the inner workings of dispute-
resolution systems in various communities.130 
Some law-and-economics scholars have picked up on these 
contributions, and indeed they seem to have informed the 
sociological-anthropological style of the Ellicksonian approach. One 
early and particularly notable foray in this regard was made by 
Professor William Landes and Professor, now Judge, Richard Posner, 
whose Adjudication as a Private Good “examined the question 
whether adjudication can be viewed as a private good, i.e., one whose 
optimal level will be generated in a free market.”131 Their answer was 
something of a qualified yes,132 and the authors even included a brief 
explanation of adjudication in primitive societies.133 But their work 
has also been criticized for employing a reductive economic approach 
and an oversimplified division between the public and private.134 
Perhaps the more relevant concern for present purposes is simply 
that such scholarship did not proliferate. Professor Felstiner 
bemoaned the fact that “[a]lthough there is an occasional note to the 
effect that ‘private informal dispute settlement . . . is significant in 
complex societies’, the references to non-government 
institutionalized adjudication or mediation within the United States 
are very sparse except within organizations, within organized 
 
 128. Felstiner, supra note 76, at 63.  
 129. Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & 
SOC’Y 217, 221 (1973). 
 130. E.g., Jesse Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1969); 
Laura Nader & Duane Metzger, Conflict Resolution in Two Mexican Communities, 65 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 584 (1963); David N. Smith, Native Courts of North Nigeria: Techniques for 
Institutional Development, 48 B.U. L. REV. 49 (1968).  
 131. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235, 284 (1979). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 242–45.  
 134. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Adjudication as a Private Good: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 303, 305–08 (1979) (“[A]n economic model which supposes private and public 
adjudication as competing in a marketplace is a seriously flawed model.”).  
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commercial activities and within some minority groups.”135 And the 
comparative attention given to the judicial function in that 
literature—most of it now decades-old—does not seem to have 
carried over to the current scholarship on custom and law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has described customary adjudication and argued that 
custom-and-law scholarship has generally undervalued it. Even if that 
premise is correct, however, many important questions remain. Much 
more must be said about when customary adjudication is likely to 
displace formal adjudication and what factors—frequency of disputes, 
the stakes at issue, the breadth of agreement on customary rules—are 
relevant. That descriptive account would in turn enable a more 
thoughtful analysis of when customary adjudication is likely to be 
efficient or otherwise normatively desirable. It would also help shed 
light on the who of customary adjudication: the people or institutions 
actually tasked with resolving disputes. Those research questions 
almost certainly require study of a particular system of customary 
adjudication—the kind of in-depth, detailed study that has proven so 
useful in the Ellicksonian-style custom-and-law literature.136 
These are important questions, and their answers are not 
obvious. If customary adjudication does not exist, why not? If custom 
creates clear rules to minimize the need for adjudication, that may 
help explain both the content and desirability of custom itself. If 
customary adjudication is fragile and tends to give way to formal 
adjudication, under what conditions does that happen? In sum, 
making sense of customary governance requires us to identify and 
explain its third branch. This Essay builds on prior scholarship in an 
effort to start doing that. 
 
 
 135. Felstiner, supra note 76, at 85 (citation omitted) (quoting Grossman & Sarat).  
 136. See, e.g., supra notes 67–72 and sources cited therein. 
